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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

If there is a drawback to Strategic Challenges, it is that for all its high-caliber
writing, the challenges it evokes seem
oddly comfortable and familiar. This is
not to imply they are not valid but
rather there is widespread agreement
that these are issues that will task future
U.S. presidents. It would have been illuminating if the authors had taken a
deeper look at more unusual challenges,
such as the growth of feral cities, the
ability of the international community
to respond to pandemics, the security
implications of global warming, and the
impact of clearly established demographic trends. Some of these issues are
mentioned, and others are actually examined to some degree, but a deeper
look at each would have been welcome.
Strategic Challenges would seem destined to become required reading for
students in the security studies field. It
is suited for both the undergraduate
and graduate level as well as lay readers
looking to gain an overview of security
threats in a minimum amount of time.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Lieber, Keir. War and the Engineers: The Primacy
of Politics over Technology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2008. 226pp. $21

Keir Lieber, a recent graduate of the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, is presently an
assistant professor and faculty fellow at
the University of Notre Dame. This is
Lieber’s first book.
One of the first books to examine and
criticize directly the current political
science analysis on “offense-defense
theory,” this work is an analysis of the
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debate as well as a well crafted refutation of the theory as a whole. The title,
however, could have been a better fit
with the content––this is not a book
about war itself, or about engineers.
In the introduction Lieber outlines the
foundations of current theory. Offensedefense theory, broadly, states that war
and peace are dependent on technology
and perceived power. If a country has
offensive capabilities, it will attack and
expand, overthrowing the status quo.
When defense predominates (ideologically, technologically, or otherwise), cooperation and peace are more likely.
Lieber questions this theory. To refute
it, in later chapters he considers both
military outcomes and political outcomes
(italics original) in specific case studies.
By analyzing offense-defense theory using its own vocabulary and definitions,
he is able to deconstruct it persuasively.
Using two case studies on “offensive”
mobility (trains in the wars of German
unification and tanks in World War I),
and two on the evolution of “defensive”
firepower (small arms in World War I
and the “nuclear revolution”), Lieber
turns the theory against itself. He effectively argues that neither offensive nor
defensive capabilities pushed or prevented war during the periods in
question.
In his conclusion Lieber offers an alternative argument, “technological opportunism,” with just enough information
to lead readers to look forward to his
next project.
Lieber’s use of sources, both primary
and secondary, is extensive, and his bibliography provides a wealth of information. His book is well written, well
argued, and concise. However, it is sure
to cause controversy, outlining as it
does both the offense-defense theory as
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well as Lieber’s refutation of it. This
work is the latest in the debate within
political science circles on the causes of
war. I highly recommend this book to
historians, political scientists, military
officers, and analysts, who should all be
familiar with offense-defense theory
and objections to it.
S. MIKE PAVELEC

Naval War College

Scheuer, Michael. Marching toward Hell: America
and Islam after Iraq. New York: Free Press, 2008.
364pp. $27

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer
offers an assessment of the war on terror, providing in varying proportions
the history, an estimate of the global
situation, recommended tactics, and a
polemic against what he believes has
both provoked al-Qa‘ida and impaired
Washington’s ability to fight it successfully. Scheuer was chief and then special
adviser to the chief of the CIA’s Bin
Laden unit from 1996 to 2004.
Scheuer’s core argument is twofold.
First, he argues that al-Qa‘ida’s attacks
America because of U.S. foreign policies
in the Islamic world, and not because of
any objection to the nature of American
society. In Scheuer’s estimate, while
jihadists do have contempt for American values, it is only Washington’s
interference in Muslim lands that motivates them to target Americans and
their allies. Second, he argues that this
misunderstanding has led Washington
to underestimate them and thus remain
superficial in its responses.
Scheuer is fairly convincing in his first
argument, primarily using statements
by al-Qa‘ida leaders to illustrate how
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they focus attention on U.S. policies
and how they use sophisticated strategies to attack (or spare from attack)
other Western nationals in proportion
to their support for those policies.
However, he also shows how ineffective
the U.S. response has been toward these
attacks, arguing that the central premise
of American strategy in the Muslim
world is flawed. That is, whether or not
America is a prosperous, free, tolerant,
and generous country is beside the
point; many Muslims may agree and yet
still believe that America deserves punishment for its policies. He then delivers stinging critiques of other U.S.
policies since 9/11—for example, deploying too few troops to Afghanistan
and deposing a natural ally against
al-Qa‘ida, Saddam Hussein.
Some of his critiques are less convincing than others. It is frustrating that the
author does not critically evaluate the
veracity of al-Qa‘ida’s accusations
against the United States or logically explain how U.S. policy failures flow directly from its failure to comprehend
al-Qa‘ida’s true motives. The book is
also riddled with run-on sentences
and strings of four-or-more-wordsconnected-by-hyphens, which better
editing could have reduced.
The value of the book for the national
security community is its identification
of eight future hot spots in the global
war on terrorism. Scheuer identifies
one of these regions, the northern Caucasus, as particularly dangerous and
well positioned to provide al-Qa‘ida
with nuclear weapons.
Because the book’s virtues, insights, and
provocative ideas are mixed with logical
gaps and woeful underdevelopment,
this reviewer cannot give it his
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